In modern warfare, information is no longer a supporting function. It is the battlefield.

That is the central message emerging from a new report by the Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET), which analyzes thousands of open‑source procurement documents published by China’s People’s Liberation Army between January 2023 and December 2024. The findings are unambiguous: China’s military is aggressively seeking artificial intelligence systems designed to counter perceived U.S. warfighting strengths—especially at sea and in space.

The report, China’s Military AI Wish List, examines requests for proposal tied to AI‑enabled command, control, communications, computers, cyber, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting—collectively known as C5ISRT. These documents provide a rare, unfiltered look at how the PLA thinks about future conflict, and what it believes it must do to win it.

At the core of the PLA’s approach is a belief that information superiority determines battlefield outcomes. According to the report, the PLA aims to gather vast amounts of data and use AI to analyze it faster than human operators can—compressing decision timelines and enabling more precise operations.

This is not abstract theory. The PLA’s procurement priorities are sharply focused on specific U.S. advantages.

One of the most striking patterns identified in the report is China’s fixation on maritime domain awareness, particularly the detection of U.S. naval assets on and under the sea. PLA officers have repeatedly expressed concern about U.S. submarines, which are difficult to track and play a central role in deterrence and power projection. The report documents numerous requests for AI‑enabled systems designed to improve underwater sensing, data fusion, and persistent maritime surveillance.

Space is the second critical arena.

The CSET analysis found “surprisingly specific” requests related to space targeting, including systems capable of identifying and tracking targets both on Earth and in orbit. These requests add weight to long‑standing warnings about China’s offensive space ambitions, suggesting that the PLA is actively preparing for scenarios in which U.S. space‑based systems would need to be monitored, degraded, or neutralized.

Beyond sensors and targeting, the PLA is also investing heavily in AI decision‑support systems. Of particular interest are systems that can ingest and analyze open‑source data—from public information to commercially available datasets—for strategic and operational decision‑making. The report highlights requests for AI‑DSS that support both high‑level planning and tactical targeting decisions.

This emphasis reflects a structural concern within the PLA itself. The report notes that Chinese military planners view AI decision aids as a way to compensate for perceived weaknesses in the officer corps, effectively embedding expertise and speed into software rather than relying solely on human judgment.

What may be most alarming to U.S. and allied defense planners is how fast the PLA wants these systems.

Many of the analyzed requests specify acquisition timelines of just three to six months, signaling a push for rapid experimentation, prototyping, and iteration rather than slow, multi‑year development cycles. This suggests a military culture increasingly comfortable with deploying imperfect systems quickly and refining them in use.

Taken together, the report paints a picture of a military racing toward algorithmic warfare—where speed of perception, decision, and action matters more than platform count or even firepower.

China is not simply building AI for efficiency. It is building AI to target U.S. advantages, reshape deterrence dynamics, and contest domains long assumed to be secure.

The era of AI as a supporting tool is ending. The era of AI as a weaponized decision engine has already begun.

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